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Abstract
Gesture and signature passwords are two-dimensional fig-
ures created by drawing on the surface of a touchscreen with
one or more fingers. Prior results about their security have
used resilience to either shoulder surfing, a human obser-
vation attack, or dictionary attacks. These evaluations re-
strict generalizability since the results are: non-comparable to
other password systems (e.g. PINs), harder to reproduce, and
attacker-dependent. Strong statements about the security of a
password system use an analysis of the statistical distribution
of the password space, which models a best-case attacker who
guesses passwords in order of most likely to least likely.
Estimating the distribution of recognition passwords is
challenging because many different trials need to map to one
password. In this paper, we solve this difficult problem by:
(1) representing a recognition password of continuous data
as a discrete alphabet set, and (2) estimating the password
distribution through modeling the unseen passwords. We
use Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) to represent
time series data as symbols and develop Markov chains to
model recognition passwords. We use a partial guessing
metric, which demonstrates how many guesses an attacker
needs to crack a percentage of the entire space, to compare
the security of the distributions for gestures, signatures, and
Android unlock patterns. We found the lower bounds of the
partial guessing metric of gestures and signatures are much
higher than the upper bound of the partial guessing metric of
Android unlock patterns.
1 Introduction
Passwords have been the dominant method for controlling
access to a computing terminal since the 1960s [35] and have
survived despite a plethora of attempts to replace them with
methods based on tokens or biometrics [10]. The mobile
computing era saw a shift among various types of user se-
crets [31]: text passwords remain the most popular technique
on desktops [21, 45, 34], whereas PINs and the 3×3 Android
Figure 1: The examples matching and recognition passwords
types. Recognition passwords are gestures (a) and signatures
(b), whereas matching password is Android patterns (c).
pattern unlock are the most popular secret types on mobile
phones. The rise of fingerprint sensors has not blunted the
momentum of passwords since one of the above methods is
often used [21, 45, 34] as a fallback authentication method in
the event of hardware failure, multiple unsuccessful unlocks,
or device start-up.
Despite differences between these three popular methods
for the generation of user-chosen passwords – patterns are
graphical and PINs use a limited 0-9 character set – each
method is an example of a matching password, which we
define as a password that can be compared directly to a
preselected pattern to determine a correct entry. Mobile
computing has enabled the rise of gestures and signatures,
two-dimensional figures that are drawn on the surface of a
touchscreen with one or more fingers. We refer to gestures
and signatures as recognition passwords since they require
a recognition algorithm to output a numeric measure of how
correct a password attempt is. The recognition algorithm
decides correctness of entry based on what figure was drawn
and how it was drawn (e.g. acceleration of the finger through
curves, timing between punctuations). Figure 1 shows exam-
ple passwords for gestures, signatures, and patterns.
Security is one of the crucial factors that determines the
value of authentication systems. However, the advantages of
novel recognition passwords are usually qualitatively eval-
uated based on shoulder surfing attacks [39, 8, 5, 6, 43] or
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Figure 2: The many-to-one problem for enumerating the pass-
word space for recognition passwords. A matching password
has only one acceptable value, but many different attempts at
a single recognition password that can map to a single user
account. An attacker should efficiently group the universe of
password trials to enumerate the passwords distribution.
are quantitatively evaluated using dictionary attacks [47, 32,
3, 2, 1]. Shoulder surfing evaluations are of limited utility
because shoulder surfing attacks cannot be deployed at scale.
The current evaluation of dictionary attacks focuses on a par-
ticular attacker. The efficiency of the attacker depends on
several factors that weaken the generalization of experimental
results, including the attacking strategy, dictionary choices,
target passwords, and the size of the dictionaries and other
datasets used. The results of these security evaluations are
non-comparable since they depend highly on the attackers’
behavior, which is not stable across experiments.
Partial guessing metrics [9], on the other hand, consider an
idealized attacker that chooses candidate passwords based on
a global knowledge of the distribution on user-chosen pass-
words for a system. These metrics quantitatively evaluate
password security based on this distribution. They have been
used to evaluate the security of matching passwords like An-
droid pattern unlocks [44, 40] and text passwords [9]. Partial
guessing metrics enable a security comparison between dif-
ferent authentication methods because they rely on the size
of the password space and the user preference for selecting
passwords.
The challenge inherent to adapting a partial guessing met-
ric for recognition passwords lies in the enumeration of the
password space. For matching passwords, any change in a
password results in a different password. For example, for
text passwords abc? and abc! are not the same because they
do not match. A small change in a recognition password,
however, could be one of two things: a different password or
an attempt at entering the known password. This is a many-to-
one matching problem, and Figure 2 shows these differences.
The factors that affect the matching results of recognition
passwords are 1) the similarity measurement between pass-
words and 2) the threshold of similarity under which two
slightly different passwords are regarded as the same. Both
of these factors are chosen by the system designer and have
limited influence on users’ password selection preferences.
To approximate the number of possible passwords a many-
to-one recognition password system has, we need an approxi-
mation method that can safely ignore the difference between
slightly different password attempts from the same user. This
Figure 3: To motivate why our approach establishes a baseline
for security consider a password space of only three possi-
ble passwords. A coarse recognizer (Recognizer 1) would
classify all shapes as the same password. A fine recognizer
(Recognizer 3) identifies each shape as different passwords,
and thus increases the size of the password space. Recognizer
2, represents the typical case, similar shapes are identified
as the same password. The number of passwords depends
on how similarity is measured. Our proposed method will
undercount the number of passwords because its many to one
mapping makes it very coarse.
approximation, however, needs to ensure that the differences
between different users’ passwords remain tangible. Our
method was to construct an approximate recognizer that we
can then use to compute the probabilities of password be-
ing chosen. We used the distinguishability between different
users’ passwords to show the validity of the approximation
method. If the false positive and false negative rates of the
approximate recognizer are comparable to actual recognizers,
then the probabilities computed will be a good approximation
to the true probabilities.
We used Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) [28],
a method that approximates time-series data through a short
sequence of symbols, as the first step in the approximate
password recognizer. Representing the password space as a
sequence of symbols allows us to group together passwords
that should be considered the same in a simple way. The rec-
ognizer compares the symbolic representation of two inputs
rather than outputting a measure of similarity between two
inputs. SAX enables us to convert a recognition password
into a set of symbols and to analyze recognition passwords in
a more manageable and less sparse password space.
With SAX, our analysis of recognition passwords provides
a baseline for the security of the true password distribution.
The size of the password space is a function of recognizer
granularity – a finer recognizer will separate passwords with
slight differences, and thus have a larger password space.
To reduce the complexity of the password space, we group
similar passwords. This approach inherently undercounts the
password space. In this way, we are providing a baseline.
This is depicted in Figure 3.
Another challenge in applying a partial guessing metric
to all novel authentication methods is the task of collecting
a large enough password dataset to reflect the distribution
of passwords. We note that it is necessary to estimate the
security of a novel authentication method with a small pass-
word dataset before it is widely deployed. Thus, we trained
a Markov chain on the largest existing recognition password
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datasets. The Markov chain models the probabilities of tran-
sitions from one symbol to another. With the transition proba-
bilities from the Markov chain, we enumerate and estimate
the probabilities of all possible passwords in this space.
In this paper, we present the first successful attempt
to quantify the security of user-chosen secrets for recog-
nition passwords and compare their security to that of
matching passwords based on a realistic model of at-
tacker behavior: a partial guessing metric. We chose
gestures and signatures as two examples of recognition
passwords since their password distributions are affected
by two different factors: 1) gesture passwords are mainly
affected by the shape of the passwords that users select,
and 2) signature passwords are mainly affected by the be-
havior that users employ to perform their passwords. Ad-
ditionally, plenty of researchers have studied these two
kinds of recognition passwords and made datasets avail-
able [39, 51, 14, 30, 29, 43, 5, 6, 49, 38, 24, 37, 52, 13].
We chose the Android unlock pattern as a representative ex-
ample of a matching password system since prior studies have
evaluated its security with partial guessing metrics [44, 40].
We solve the many-to-one mapping problem for recog-
nition passwords by discretizing them. We applied
SAX [28] to represent the time series data of recognition
passwords as discrete symbols. By comparing the recognition
performance of SAX to the commonly used recognition meth-
ods (Protractor [39, 51, 14], DTW [29, 43, 5, 6], Garda [30]),
we show that SAX retains enough information that separates
discretized passwords to for them to remain distinguishable.
We estimate upper and lower bounds of password secu-
rity using a small dataset. Specifically, we trained a Markov
chain model with our largest existing password dataset and
estimated the probabilities of all theoretical possible pass-
words. Since novel authentication methods always suffer
from the common concern that a relatively small password
dataset cannot cover the general password distribution, we
used two strategies to deal with the uncovered passwords:
1) assigning them zero probability, and 2) assigning them a
small probability value. These two strategies lead to the upper
and lower bounds for the security estimation of passwords.
Finally, we studied human selection bias in recognition
passwords. We found that people prefer to start recognition
passwords in the upper left corner and end passwords in the
bottom right corner on a 2-D touchscreen.
2 Related Work
Morris and Thompson [35] were the first to document how
user-chosen text passwords are vulnerable to dictionary at-
tacks due to users choosing overlapping patterns with specific
meanings rather than random text strings. Dictionary attack
efficiency was improved by the development of probabilistic
context-free grammar [47], John the Ripper [3], Hashcat [2],
Markov chains [32], and neural networks [34]. The key dif-
ference in these techniques is how the guessing attack is
generated, but the idea remains the same: humans are more
likely to choose from a weak subspace instead of the full
space of available passwords.
Graphical passwords similarly have weak subspaces that al-
low dictionary attacks. Thorpe and Van Oorschot [42] found
that people preferred to use symmetry to create passwords
with Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [20]. Similarly, an analysis of
Pass-Go [41] showed that 49% of users’ passwords are al-
phanumeric or well-known symbols and that 40% of users
used either vertically or horizontally symmetric patterns to
generate their passwords. Passfaces [4] is a recognition-based
variation of graphical passwords. A field study showed that
people are more likely to use their own race’s faces as pass-
words [15]. Passpoints [48] is another cued-recall graphical
password variation. Its major weaknesses are hotspots [46]
(e.g. image areas that people tend to choose) and patterns [12]
(e.g. simple shapes that people are more likely to choose as
PassPoints). All types of graphical passwords have a weak
subspace that can be used for password cracking.
Attacks on gesture passwords have used shoulder surfing,
in which attackers attempt to observe a user entering their
password and then imitate it from memory [5, 6, 43, 39].
Shoulder surfing attacks cannot be deployed at scale and
are not suitable for showing the general security of an au-
thentication system except under targeted attacks. Guessing
attacks [29] were developed for gesture passwords and found
that an efficient dictionary attack method could be derived
from the fact that people prefer to use common graphical sym-
bols as passwords. However, this method cannot crack any
passwords that are not covered by the dictionary and cannot
be used for analyzing a full password space. In this paper, we
estimated the distribution of the entire password space with
SAX and Markov chains and use partial guessing metric to
model attacker behavior. This allows us to compare matching
and recognition passwords.
Partial guessing has become an established metric for secu-
rity analysis. Bonneau [9] proposed partial guessing metrics
to model real-world attacks, wherein attackers only crack a
portion of weak passwords and give up on guessing more
difficult accounts. Uellenbeck et al. [44] applied partial guess-
ing metric to evaluate the security of Android unlock patterns
and PINs. However, they measured the guessing metric by
cracking subsets of their collected data rather than through
an estimation of the user-chosen distribution. Song et al. [40]
proposed a strength meter for Android unlock patterns and
evaluated it using partial guessing metric. Aviv et al. [7]
studied the impact on the security of Android unlock pattern
when the grid size was increased from 3×3 to 4×4 and found
that this change does not improve the security of the Android
unlock patterns. Kiesel et al. [25] evaluated text password se-
curity using partial guessing metric for secure and mnemonic
passwords.
The research community has created various methods for
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recognizing gestures and signatures. Dynamic Time Warp-
ing (DTW) is the most widely used recognition method for
gesture password systems [5, 43, 49, 6] and is also widely
used in signature authentication systems [23, 17]. Free-form
gestures have used recognition methods based on cosine simi-
larity [39, 14, 51]. Garda [30], a multi-expert authentication
system combining Gaussian Mixture Models and Protrac-
tor [26], has been proposed for free-form gestures. Liu et
al. [30] show that the recognition methods based on both co-
sine similarity and Garda are applicable for online signature
passwords.
There are many studies on the guessability and security
of matching passwords. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no existing work on analyzing the security of
recognition passwords because of their many-to-one problem
for passwords. Here, we present the first attempt to quanti-
tatively analyze matching passwords with partial guessing
metric. We show that recognition passwords have a higher
partial guessing metric than Android unlock patterns. We
used SAX to encode the time sequence data of recognition
passwords as a short sequence of discrete symbols. This out-
puts a recognition result comparable to the strongest freeform
gesture recognizer – Garda [30], which means that SAX is a
reasonable discretization model for gesture passwords.
3 Roadmap
This section contains high-level descriptions of the logic in-
volved in the later parts of the paper to help the reader better
understand the presentation order of the paper and the mean-
ing behind certain choices that were made. The technical
details of our work follow immediately after this section.
We will present our ideas in the following order:
(1) How does an attacker behave to crack passwords?
(2) How to discretize the recognition password space?
(3) How to assign probability to a given password?
(4) How to estimate password security with a small dataset?
3.1 Attacker Behavior: The Threat Model
There are multiple ways an attacker can behave when tar-
geting passwords. Their behavior can change based on the
amount of information they have and their overall objective
in trying to crack a specific password. An attacker could
be focusing all their effort on trying to crack a single pass-
word without a thought to the many other passwords in the
set. An attacker could use observations to gain information
about the password, data mine a particular user to obtain ideas
about what the password might contain, or attempt to steal
the password through other means.
This targeting behavior is not useful for trying to evaluate
the general security of an authentication method since it is
not feasible for an attacker to exert this same level of effort
for every individual user. Bonneau [9] outlined a framework
for evaluating the security of text passwords based on the
entire password distribution. In this framework, an attacker
has access to a large number of accounts and is interested in
maximizing the benefit of cracking a given account while min-
imizing the cost of cracking the same account. They do not
have any prior information about the person whose password
they are trying to crack. One might imagine that this is akin
to obtaining a large list of email addresses and trying to crack
the password for each one of those emails. The attacker
applies a number of guesses while trying to crack some
percentage of the entire account set. By stopping after
a fixed number of guesses, they do not waste resources
on accounts with difficult passwords. By stopping after
cracking some percentage of the targeted accounts, they
will have achieved some minimal benefit. We emphasize
this point because it determines how we calculate security.
Secret selection by humans is usually biased, creating a
subset of more likely passwords in the distribution that we
refer to as the weak set of passwords. An attacker who is in-
formed about the password distribution is capable of ordering
their guesses from most likely to least likely. Therefore, pass-
word systems with a more concentrated distribution are more
likely to be cracked and thus have lower security. Figure 4
illustrates three types of password systems with different dis-
tributions. An ideal password system would have a uniform
distribution, with all passwords being equally likely. This
would prevent an attacker from gaining an advantage by or-
dering attacks, and the attacker would therefore have to guess
randomly. The security of a password system is tied to the
distribution of user choice.
Given this attacker behavior, the security metrics of bio-
metric systems, like True Positive Rates and False Positive
Rates, are misleading for assessing the security of recognition
passwords. Typical biometric systems do not have a compo-
nent of user choice. They are based on immutable human
characteristics that are highly differentiable – fingerprints,
for example – and cannot be changed at will. The primary
security mechanism for biometrics is the high degree of sepa-
ration among thousands of people. Therefore, it makes sense
to discuss security with TPR and FPR for biometric systems.
For a recognition password, security is primarily derived
from the choice of the secret– that is, how likely it is that
another person or attacker will select the same password. TPR
and FPR measure the accuracy of a recognizer in separating
out obviously different passwords; they are not a statement of
security. The important metric here is the distribution of the
user choice of passwords, and we therefore need an efficient
recognizer to estimate that distribution.
3.2 Research Challenge: Discretizing the
Recognition Password Space
Based on the above subsection, we now know how an intelli-
gent attacker will behave towards a large number of accounts:
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Figure 4: Example of different password distributions. The
ideal password distribution is uniform, in which all passwords
are equally probable. A weak password distribution usually
has a narrow peak, meaning most user passwords fall in a
small set: the weak set. An informed attacker would use the
most probable passwords in the weak set when guessing. We
can improve the passwords security by broadening the set that
people are more likely to select from.
attackers order their attacks efficiently in order not to waste
effort on accounts that are too difficult to crack. The attacker
should select the most likely passwords and move from there,
and they should try different users’ passwords instead of try-
ing different variations of the same user’s password. Both of
these needs lead to one question: how can one transform all
variations of a given password into a simple representation?
The main challenge here is that recognition passwords
are a many-to-one mapping. In our paper, we perform this
transformation using Symbolic Aggregate ApproXimation
(SAX). SAX transforms time-series data into a symbolic set.
Passwords that are similar to each other, when passed through
SAX, become the same character string. In this way, it is easy
to group the passwords together.
3.3 Research Challenge: Enumerating and
Assigning Probabilities to the Passwords
By representing the long time series data of recognition pass-
words with short discrete SAX symbols, we are capable of
enumerating the entire password distribution by listing all
possible combinations of strings together. As such, it is pos-
sible to take the entire password set into account. However,
assigning probabilities to these newly generated passwords is
still an issue.
The representation of a password as a string has benefits
besides solving the counting problem: it can be used in com-
bination with Markov chains. The guiding principle behind
a Markov chain is that the next symbol in a human-chosen
string depends on some number of the previously chosen sym-
bols. This logic comes from the intuition that, when given a
partial example of a text string like gestu..., it is highly likely
the whole string with the remaining characters is gesture.
The attacker transforms every recognition password in their
corpus of prior data into a text string. Then, they pass these
text strings through the Markov chain to obtain probabilities
for every possible string in the set. This estimation method
has been used in the past with text passwords [32, 36] and
Android unlock patterns [44, 40]. Thus, the attacker can as-
Figure 5: Example of passwords distributions with different
methods for addressing the uncovered passwords issue. The
actual passwords distribution represents the real passwords
distribution. The distributions with and without smoothing
methods represent the passwords distribution with the two
methods for addressing the uncovered passwords issue.
sign probabilities to every generated password to obtain a full
distribution that they can deploy to attack a set of accounts.
3.4 Research Challenge: Estimate Password
Security with A Small Dataset
One of the key difficulties in generating Markov chain esti-
mates of a password space distribution is completeness. A
model is complete when it assigns a non-zero probability to
all possible passwords. If a model is incomplete, then some
passwords have zero probability – we call these uncovered
passwords. When the completeness of a model is poor, the
estimated password distribution will skip over passwords that
are likely to be selected by people but are not covered by the
trained Markov chain model.
There are two factors that may lead passwords to remain
uncovered. First, the passwords may be very unlikely to be
selected by people. Second, the passwords may be likely to be
selected by people, but the dataset may not cover them. Based
on these two reasons, we used two strategies to deal with the
covered passwords: (1) leaving the uncovered passwords as
zero probability, and (2) assigning small fixed probabilities to
the uncovered passwords. The first method can help us elimi-
nate impossible passwords, and the second method avoids a
situation in which potential passwords are skipped. Figure 5
illustrates the password distribution that results after each of
these two methods is applied. We found that the password
distribution that results from the application of a smoothing
method has a peak wider than the actual password distribution
while the distribution that appears without smoothing has a
peak narrower than the actual password distribution. This
means the model of password distribution that does not use
a smoothing method underestimates password security and
the model that does use a smoothing method overestimates
security. Therefore, these two models will provide upper and
lower bounds on the password security estimation.
4 Password Datasets
We aggregated the largest available gesture dataset and a large
signature dataset to analyze recognition passwords. We used
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Dataset PW # Dataset PW #
FreeForm [39] 684 SUSig [24] 1880
Wild [51] 1536 MCYT [37] 2500
GuessAttack [29] 436 SVC2004 [52] 800
Android (Def) [44] 113 Android (Off) [44] 573
Table 1: Summary of analyzed datasets. The top left three
datasets are gestures, the top right three are signatures. The
bottom two are Android unlock patterns datasets.
gesture datasets from the following studies: FreeForm [39],
Wild [51], and GuessAttack [29]. In each of these studies,
the participants are asked to create accounts with gestures as
passwords. The gesture passwords for each account need to
be replicated at least once. In total, there are 2656 gesture
password samples from 655 types of gesture passwords. The
signatures dataset includes three publicly available datasets:
SUSig [24], MCYT-100 [37], and SVC2004 [52]. There are
5180 signature samples in total from 234 participants, and
all of them were collected in a laboratory setting. Table 1
summarizes the datasets.
To analyze Android unlock patterns as a reference for
matching passwords, we requested and obtained 113 defen-
sive Android unlock patterns and 573 offensive Android un-
lock patterns from 113 participants [44]. To generate de-
fensive patterns, participants were asked to create Android
unlock patterns that are difficult for others to crack. Similarly,
to create an offensive pattern, participants created Android
unlock patterns they felt were most likely to crack other users’
patterns. Our study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) of Rutgers University.
5 Discretization of Recognition Passwords
Before estimating the distribution of the password space, we
must transform recognition passwords into a set of symbols.
With a known set of symbols and sufficient training data, we
can later use a Markov chain to generate the distribution of
passwords we have not yet seen.
In this section, we describe the process of representing
recognition passwords with SAX. We discuss the many-to-
one mapping of gestures to symbol sequences and how that
mapping is used to populate the training data set. Finally, we
discuss the method used to determine the parameters used in
2-D SAX.
5.1 Represent by 2-D SAX
We used Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) [27] to
normalize and discretize the time sequence data of a recogni-
tion password so that it can be represented as short sequence
of symbols. SAX uses a sequence of symbols with a fixed
length ω to represent a time series data of length n, where
ω n [27]. Figure 6 shows the steps for approximating a
recognition password with 2-D SAX.
1. Decompose password. We decomposed a gesture into
two 1-D time sequences: X time series and Y time series.
The time series of X and Y are normalized to be zero
mean and unit standard deviation.
2. PAA representation. We approximate a password’s 1-D
time sequences by Piecewise Aggregate Approximation
(PAA) [22]. PAA approximates a time series by segment-
ing it into ω equal-length subsequences and representing
each subsequence by its mean.
3. 1-D SAX representation, we use SAX [27] to map the
value of PAA representation into different symbols based
on the partitioned ranges. Each value range is chosen to
have the same probability according to the normalized
distribution, which is an important step to guarantee that
each symbols are chosen with the same probability. In
our example in Step 3 of Figure 6, the normal distribu-
tion is divided into six equal probabilities ranges with
five boundaries, {-0.97, -0.43, 0, 0.43, 0.97} and the six
ranges are represented by six symbols, {a,b,c,d,e,f }. The
five boundary values are obtained by using the inverse-
CDF of the standard normal distribution, which outputs
the point at which a certain amount of probability is
contained. If there are six equiprobable regions, then
CDF−1( 16 ) = −0.97, CDF−1( 26 ) = −0.43, and so on. The
point at which zero probability is contained is −∞ and
the point of all probability is∞.
4. 2-D SAX representation. 2-D SAX is simply a com-
bination of SAX sequences of X and Y. It also can be
represented by a 2-D matrix on the rightmost graph in
Figure 6 following the order of the cells. The rightmost
graph shows the area of a gesture represented by 36 cells
with different value combinations in X and Y coordi-
nates and the gesture is chopped into eight pieces based
on PAA. For each gesture piece, SAX used its means in
X and Y coordinates to assign the 36 SAX cells.
We used and extended MINDIST function, which is de-
fined for 1-D SAX [28], to measure the similarity of 2-D
SAX representations of recognition passwords. With the orig-
inal MINDIST, we measure the similarity of two 1-D SAX
sequences Qˆ = qˆ1, ..., qˆω and Cˆ = cˆ1, ..., cˆω as following:
MINDIST (Qˆ,Cˆ) = n/ω
√
ω∑
i=1
(dist(qˆi, cˆi)) (1)
dist(qˆ, cˆ) =
0, if |qˆ− cˆ| ≤ 1βmax(qˆ,cˆ)−βmin(qˆ,cˆ), otherwise
6
Figure 6: Representing recognition passwords as a sequence of symbols using 2-D SAX. First, the password is decomposed into
X and Y 1-D coordinate time sequences. In Step 2, each time sequence is normalized to have its mean set to zero and the standard
deviation equal to one. The time sequence is then evenly segmented using PAA [22] into eight subsequences. SAX then maps
the means of the eight subsequences into the six symbols: a,b,c,d,e, f . The boundaries of the six symbols are calculated using
the distribution on the left, where each symbol is defined to have equal probability. In Step 3, we combine the SAX sequence of
X and Y to form a 2-D SAX sequence, which can also be represented as a 2-D map as seen in the rightmost figure.
a b c d e f
a 0 0 0.54 0.97 1.4 1.94
b 0 0 0 0.43 0.86 1.4
c 0.54 0 0 0 0.43 0.97
d 0.97 0.43 0 0 0 0.54
e 1.4 0.86 0.43 0 0 0
f 1.94 1.4 0.97 0.54 0 0
Table 2: A lookup table for dist() in MINDIST function when
there are six possible symbols in SAX (i.e. β = 6). The
distance between two symbols can be easily found in the
table. For example, dist(d, f ) = 0.54.
Where n is the length of the original time sequence and
ω is the length of the time sequence represented by SAX.
dist() is used to measure the distance between two symbols
of SAX. β is the set of boundaries of the symbols in SAX.
The MINDIST codifies the requirements for two sequences
to be regarded as distinct.
The distance is straightforward to calculate once the bound-
aries are known. Assume there are six symbols: a, b, c, d, e,
f as seen in Figure 6. The five boundaries separating the six
equiprobable ranges in the normalized distribution are {0.97,
0.43, 0, -0.43, -0.97}, according to the inverse-CDF of the nor-
mal distribution. Since |a−b| = 1, dist(a,b) = 0 and |a−c| = 2,
dist(a,c) = βmax(a,c)−βmin(a,c) = βa−βc = 0.97− (0.43) = 0.54.
The dist() function can be implemented by a lookup table as
shown in Table 2.
Previously, Qˆ and Cˆ represent a time sequence of one
dimension; in our modification, we define that Qˆ and Cˆ rep-
resent a time sequence of D dimensions. Accordingly, the
distance between the D dimensions is simply the sum of the
distance of the one dimension symbols.
5.2 Determining Parameters in 2-D SAX
We have described how 1-D and 2-D symbols can be trans-
formed into a symbolic sequence using SAX. However, there
are important parameters that need to be determined rigor-
ously in order to obtain the tightest bound possible on the
password distribution. In order to discretize recognition pass-
words with 2-D SAX, we need to determine two parameters:
the length of a symbolic sequence, ω, and the alphabet of
symbols, β. Increasing the values of the parameters increases
the overall size of the password space – by analogy, creat-
ing a new character for the Roman alphabet increases the
space size for text passwords. The larger the parameters, the
larger the difference between the different variations of the
same password. Increasing the size of the parameters con-
flicts with the main goal of discretization, which is to narrow
the difference between the variations of the same password.
Thus we would like to minimize ω and β. However, if we
make the parameters too small, we will reach a point where
no passwords are distinguishable. Thus we need to choose
the smallest possible parameters that meet some minimum
criteria of distinguish-ability (e.g. circles and squares are
still seen to be different). In this section, we will introduce
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and the Area
Under Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUROC) as
evaluation metrics for ω and β. Then, we will present the
optimal parameters for 2-D SAX.
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Figure 7: A contour plot showing isolines of AUROC for
signature and gesture datasets based on different values of ω
and β. When ω≥ 8 and β≥ 6, the AUROC of SAX of gestures
and signatures do not change by more than 0.001 and 0.015,
respectively. The isolines are erratic since the AUROC is
highly dependent on the combination of β and ω; these two
parameters are not orthogonal. We observed the that AUROC
gradually decreases when ω and β increase.
5.2.1 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
The ROC curve is used to measure the recognition perfor-
mance of recognition password systems. It is drawn by plot-
ting the True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate with dif-
ferent recognition thresholds. The closer the curve is to the
upper left corner, the better the recognition performance.
5.2.2 Area Under ROC (AUROC) curve
Because the recognition performance of different recogniz-
ers is evaluated on the same datasets, we can evaluate their
distinguishability by computing the Area Under ROC (AU-
ROC) curve. AUROC reflects the probability that a randomly
chosen true password is ranked higher than a randomly cho-
sen false password [19]. It measures the distinguishability
between the positive and negative samples. The higher of the
AUROC, the more distinguishable between the samples.
5.2.3 Optimal values of parameters ω and β
Based on our analysis, we found that the length of a symbolic
sequence, ω = 8, and the alphabet of symbols, β = 6 balances
the AUROC. Figure 7 shows that when ω ≥ 8 and β ≥ 6, the
AUROC of the SAX recognizer for both gestures and signa-
tures does not change significantly. This implies that when
ω ≥ 8 and β ≥ 6, the gestures and signatures from different
users are only slightly more distinguishable.
5.3 Recognition Performance of SAX
SAX strips information away from recognition passwords
through discretization. The rightmost side of Figure 6 also
shows that gestures are significantly distorted by SAX. The
Figure 8: ROC curves and Area Under ROC (AUROC) of
four recognizers for gestures and signatures. From (a) ROC
curves, we see SAX is only slightly worse than the other three
recognizers. From (b) AUROC, we observe that the AUROC
of SAX is comparable to the other recognizers. The takeaway
is there is no large difference between the four recognizers.
distinguishability of recognition passwords is a metric that
shows whether SAX accurately models user behavior in draw-
ing recognition passwords. To show that discretized pass-
words still reliably distinguish passwords among different
users, we can examine the recognition performance of those
discretized passwords with the ROC and AUROC. If the
recognition performance of SAX is as good as that of other
state-of-the-art recognizers, we can conclude that SAX is a
valid discretizing method for recognition passwords.
The ROC curves for SAX have results comparable to those
of other three recognizers. Figure 8 (a) shows signature and
gesture ROC curves for the four recognizers: SAX, Protrac-
tor [39, 51, 14], DTW [29, 43, 5, 50, 6], and Garda [30]. Note
that SAX is not meant to be the best recognizer – our goal
is to demonstrate that the symbolic representation maintains
enough detail to distinguish gestures well enough. In this
regard, the fact that it has performance that is comparable
to other recognition methods allows us to consider SAX a
success in this case. We also evaluated SAX using the AU-
ROC to determine the distinguishability between user and
attacker passwords. Figure 8 (b) shows the AUROC of four
recognizers with gesture and signature datasets. We found
that the AUROC values of SAX are close to those of the other
three recognizers. This demonstrates that SAX has an abil-
ity to distinguish positive samples from negative ones that is
comparable to those of the other recognizers.
In summary, representing recognition passwords with SAX
can reduce the password space while maintaining the distin-
guishability of passwords.
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6 Recognition Password Distributions
We have mapped the recognition passwords to a countable
password space using SAX. We now need to estimate the user-
chosen password distribution. Collecting data is not enough to
do this, as it is very difficult to collect hundreds of thousands
of passwords to represent the distribution. With SAX, we can
enumerate the entire password space as a combination of all
possible strings. A Markov chain will be trained with prior
data to assign probabilities to the generated passwords.
6.1 Markov Chain
Markov chains have been used to estimate the distribution
for both text passwords [32, 36] and Android unlock pat-
terns [44, 40]. The probability is computed as the product
of conditional probabilities which represent the likelihood
of transitioning from one symbol to the next in a sequence.
These transition probabilities are estimated by their relative
frequency of occurrence in a known data set. The guiding
principle behind in a Markov chain is that the next symbol
in a human-chosen string depends on some number of the
previously chosen symbols.
An n-gram Markov chain predicts the next observation
in a string based on the previous n − 1 observations. To
build Markov chains, there are two types of conditional
probabilities that need to be estimated: 1) the probability
of the starting symbol; 2) the probability of the transition
to the next symbol given the previous n− 1 symbols. For
example, to build a 2-gram Markov chain for a sequence
s = {s1, s2, ..., s8}, we need to estimate: 1) the starting symbol
probability p(s1); 2) the transition probability p(si+1|si) i , 0.
Then, we can calculate the probability of the sequence s as
P(s) = P(s1)P(s2|s1)...P(s7|s6)P(s8|s7).
To model the passwords based on an n-gram Markov chain,
we need to determine n and our smoothing methods.
6.1.1 Selecting n
The value of n defines both the number of previous symbols
on which a transition depends as well as the length of the
start sequence. Take the previous 2-D SAX sequences as an
example: when n = 4, the probability of a certain symbol
appearing should be based on the prior three symbols. The
start sequence should include various combinations of the first
three symbols of a sequence, which makes for 363 = 46,656
choices. A larger value of n can yield more accurate pre-
dictions of the sequence by accounting for longer historical
correlations. However, this gain in accuracy can also lead to
over-fitting as many transitions may be assigned zero proba-
bility because the preceding sequence is never observed.
To determine a practical value of n for the amount of data
we have available, we can estimate the how large the zero
probability blocks are by computing the expected number of
times a given start sequence will be observed as a function
of n. To simplify this problem, we assume that each start
sequence is equally likely. Therefore, the expected number of
observations of any particular starting sequence is as follows:
E(observation) =
T
(β2)n−1
=
T
(36)n−1
(2)
T is the total number of passwords in the data set. For
the gesture dataset, T = 3245, and for the signature dataset,
T = 5026. When n = 2, a given start sequence is expected
to be observed 90.14 and 139.6 times for the gestures and
signatures respectively. When n = 3, the expected numbers
for gestures and signatures drop to 2.50 and 3.88. When
n = 4, they drop to 0.07 and 0.11. Since there are fewer
than one observations for each start symbol when n = 4, it is
clear that models with this depth or greater will assign zero
probability to almost all passwords and are thus unusable.
Thus, we only consider n-gram models with n = 2 and n = 3.
6.1.2 Smoothing
Aside from assigning a small value for n to deal with un-
covered passwords, a more common approach involves es-
timating the probabilities of the uncovered passwords using
smoothing methods. We tested two smoothing methods: 1)
additive smoothing, and 2) Good-Turing smoothing [18]. Ad-
ditive smoothing adds a constant small value λ to the counts
of the Markov chain transition matrix. We assign λ to the
uncovered data, which are originally valued at zero, to make
sure all theoretical possible data have some probability of
occurring. Based on our tests, we selected λ = 0.01. Good-
Turing smoothing uses the observed total probability of class
r+ 1 to estimate the total probability of class r. The total
probability of class r is a class of probability of transitions
from a symbol to another symbol that has occurred r times in
total.
6.2 Optimizing Markov Chains for Recogni-
tion Passwords
We have proposed SAX to represent recognition passwords
with discrete symbols, and we have used Markov chains to
estimate the probability of recognition passwords. We cannot
judge a priori which configuration of Markov chains is most
suitable for predicting recognition passwords. The optimal
Markov chain should be most efficient at cracking recogni-
tion passwords. We will use guessing entropy [11, 33] to
demonstrate the cracking efficiency of the Markov chains.
6.2.1 Guessing Entropy
Guessing entropy [11, 33] measures the average number
of guesses required to crack an entire set of passwords
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Figure 9: Guessing entropy of recognition passwords under
six configurations of Markov chain: 2-gram Additive, 2-gram
Good-Turing, 2-gram without smoothing, 3-gram Additive,
3-gram Good-Turing, and 3-gram without smoothing. Gen-
erally, 3-gram Markov chains for gestures and signatures are
better than 2-gram models. There is no obvious difference
between with and without smoothing methods.
X = {x1, x2, ..., xN} in the optimal guessing order. Specifi-
cally, a guessing entropy curve represents the percentage of
a dataset that is cracked as the number of guesses increases.
It reflects the strength of the target passwords. Generally,
a given guessing entropy means that it takes an average of
so many guesses to crack some proportion of the data (see
Figure 9). An attacker ranks their guesses from most likely to
least likely and proceeds in that order as they attack.
6.2.2 Markov Chain Implementation
In order to estimate the guessing entropy with the Markov
chain, we performed a 10-fold cross validation. We first com-
bined the three gesture datasets (FreeForm [39], Wild [51],
and GuessAttack [29]) into one dataset. Then, we split it into
ten subsets with roughly the same number of accounts. For
each training process, we selected one subset as a testing set
and used the other nine subsets as a training set. We repeated
this training process ten times.
6.2.3 Comparison of Markov Chains
We tested both 2-gram and 3-gram Markov chains with and
without the two smoothing methods, Good-Turing and addi-
tive, for the two types of recognition passwords: gestures and
signatures, as Figure 9 shows. We needed to find Markov
models for both the upper- and lower-bound estimates for the
security of passwords.
The 3-gram Markov chain with Good-Turing smoothing
achieves the highest cracking rates with the same average
number of guesses for both gesture and signature passwords.
We found the 3-gram Markov chains to be more efficient than
the 2-gram models. Taking gestures as an example, the 3-
gram Markov chain with the Good-Turing smoothing method
is at least ten percentage points higher in efficiency than
the 2-gram Markov chain with the Good-Turing smoothing
method. However, the choice of smoothing method does not
have a significant impact on guessing entropy. For example,
we found that the 2-gram Markov chains with additive and
Good-Turing smoothing nearly overlap for both gestures and
signatures. The difference between Markov chains with and
without smoothing is also not obvious with the exception of
cases in which the target passwords have zero probabilities in
the Markov chain. For example, we found that the guessing
entropy of gestures based on a 3-gram model with and with-
out Good-Turing smoothing are close to each other before
226 guesses. Then, the guessing entropy of the Markov chain
without smoothing is stable since the rest of the target pass-
words have zero probability under this model. Therefore, we
selected the 3-gram Markov model with Good-Turing smooth-
ing to model the upper bound of the password distribution
and selected the 3-gram Markov model without smoothing to
model the lower bound of the password distribution.
7 Partial Guessing Metric
Since guessing entropy, discussed above in Section 6.2.1, is
based on the cracking rate of a specific password dataset,
the security of the passwords will be over-or-under-estimated
depending on the quality of that dataset.
Bonneau [9] proposed a partial guessing metric (or α−
guesswork) for user-chosen passwords based on the password
distribution to overcome the problems inherent in guessing
entropy. The partial guessing metric models a practical at-
tack situation in which the attacker has knowledge of the
general password distribution χ = {x1, x2, · · · } with the goal of
cracking a certain percentage of the passwords.
We define µα(χ) = min( j|Σ ji=1p(xi) ≥ α) as the minimal
number of needed guesses to crack a α proportion of pass-
words, and define λµα(χ)(χ) = λµα(χ) = Σ
µα
i=1p(xi) as the the
actual cracked proportion of passwords with µα(χ) guesses.
Then, the partial guessing metric is defined as
Gα(χ) = (1−λµα ) ·µα +Σµαi=1p(xi) · i (3)
where the first term reflects a fraction of passwords that are
not cracked within a given number of guesses while the sec-
ond term reflects the minimum expected number of guesses
needed to crack the fraction α of possible passwords selected
by people.
It is important to emphasize the key difference between
guessing entropy and a partial guessing metric. Guessing
entropy analyzes the cracking rate of a particular set of target
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passwords. In contrast, a partial guessing metric analyzes a
fraction of the distributions of user-chosen passwords. For
example, the estimation would vary when the set is non-
representative of the population or if there is skew introduced
by participants. Imagine a set with ten passwords, nine of
which are cracked within 100 guesses while the last one is
cracked after 109 guesses. This makes the guessing entropy
higher than 108, which is an extreme overestimation. The
system is not secure since 90% of the passwords were cracked
within 100 guesses. This is why a partial guessing metric is a
preferable security metric for comparing passwords1.
8 Results
We first present the major result that was made possible by
this present work: a quantitative evaluation of the security of
recognition passwords by the partial guessing metric. Then,
we compare the partial guessing metric between recognition
passwords and Android unlock patterns. Finally, we examine
biases in the distribution of gesture passwords and signatures.
8.1 Upper and Lower Bounds on Password Se-
curity
Figure 10 shows that when the sizes of password datasets
increase, the partial guessing metric estimation based on a
Markov model with Good-Turing smoothing will decrease
and the partial guessing metric based on a Markov model
without smoothing will increase. This observation matches
our analysis of the influence of the uncovered passwords on
the password distribution, as Figure 5 shows.
Based on the observations of Figure 10, if we keep increas-
ing the size of the datasets, the partial guessing metric curve
of Good-Turing method will keep decreasing and the curve
without smoothing method will keep increasing. Eventually,
they will converge to the partial guessing metric of the actual
password distribution.
In conclusion, with the current size of our recognition pass-
word dataset, we are able to provide upper and lower bounds
on the partial guessing metric of gestures and signatures.
8.2 Comparison to Android Unlock Patterns
Figure 11 shows that recognition passwords, gestures, and
signatures have a higher partial guessing metric than Android
unlock patterns. For gestures, the lower bound of the partial
guessing metric is 45 bits when the cracking rate α= 0.2. This
1Partial guessing metric is not used to adjust the parameters of the Markov
chain. Guessing entropy is used to adjust the model because we measure
performance by successfully cracking as many passwords in the training set
as possible without consideration to how much work is required to crack
those passwords. A Markov chain cannot be trained with partial guessing
metric since it requires probabilities to be assigned to an entire distribution,
whereas we need the Markov chain to assign those probabilities.
Figure 10: Partial guessing metric of gestures and signa-
tures that estimated based on different sizes of passwords
datasets. We found the partial guessing metric curves with
Good-Turing smoothing method decreases when the pass-
word datasets size increase. Similarly, we found the partial
guessing metric curves without smoothing methods increases
when the password datasets size increase.
Figure 11: Partial guessing metric for different types of pass-
words. We found the lower bounds of security of recognition
passwords (gestures and signatures) are considerably higher
than Android unlock patterns.
is 37 bits higher than the upper bound of defense-oriented An-
droid unlock patterns with α = 0.2. The password distribution
of Android unlock patterns is modeled on the 3-gram Markov
model with additive smoothing [44]. Similarly, for signatures,
the lower bound of the partial guessing metric is 52 bits when
the cracking rate α = 0.2, which is also much higher than the
corresponding metric for Android unlock patterns.
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Figure 12: Biases of the start and end points of gestures (upper
two figures) and signatures (lower two figures). Generally, for
both gestures and signatures, the passwords start from the top
left corner of the screen and finish at the bottom right corner.
8.3 Human Bias in Recognition Passwords
We studied human bias in gesture and signature passwords.
Specifically, we analyzed the distribution of the password
starting and ending points and the connecting pattern in the
passwords. Figure 12 shows where the starting and ending
points of gestures and signatures are found on a screen across
the datasets. We found that passwords usually start from the
top left corner and end at the bottom right corner of the screen.
A possible reason for this is that writing habits in Western
cultures move from left to right and from top to bottom.
We examined the covered percentages of 2-gram and 3-
gram variations. However, we did not find obvious bias in
those two models that we might suggest users avoid. We
include them as Figure 13 in Appendix A for reference.
9 Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented the first paper to quantitatively evalu-
ate the security of recognition passwords using a partial
guessing metric. We were able to do this because we are
the first to estimate the distribution of recognition passwords
using Markov chains. Specifically, we have demonstrated that
recognition passwords given as time-series data can be rep-
resented as symbolic expressions using SAX. The symbolic
alphabet can be combined with datasets of user-chosen pass-
words to compute Markov chains for a given method. These
Markov chains can then be used to approximate the full pass-
word distribution by estimating the likelihood of unknown
passwords. With the estimated password distribution, we
quantitatively evaluated the security of recognition passwords
by calculating their partial guessing metrics.
We estimated the security of recognition passwords
using upper and lower bounds with a relatively small
dataset. For novel passwords, there are always concerns
that the dataset is not large enough to reflect the full password
distribution. However, it is still necessary to estimate the
security of novel passwords before they are widely employed.
As Figure 5 shows, the two strategies: (1) assigning zero
probability (2) assigning a small probability to all of the un-
covered passwords will lead to the upper bound and the lower
bound on the password distribution estimation. To verify our
analysis on the influence of password security estimation by
these two methods, we sub-sampled the recognition password
datasets to various smaller sizes. Figure 10 shows that the
changing trends of partial guessing metrics with different
password dataset sizes match our analysis. These two bounds
of recognition passwords allow a direct, numeric comparison
to the security of matching passwords as well as any other
recognition password.
We quantitatively compared the security of recognition
passwords to that of Android unlock patterns. We have
quantitatively shown that the security of gesture and signature
passwords has a higher partial guessing metric than the An-
droid pattern unlock method [39, 16, 29]. Prior work made
arguments about security in three different ways: (1) quan-
tifying the amount of expressive information contained in
free-form gestures [39], (2) calculating the size of the to-
tal password space [39], and (3) segmenting the grid into
patterns and calculating random entropy. However, these
security measures are not as reliable as a partial guessing
metric because they do not address how users or attackers
behave [9]. The higher the partial guessing metric, the more
secure the password system is. After assessing the number of
guesses per account an attacker needs to deploy in order to
crack an α-sized portion of all accounts on multiple different
scales (Figure 9), we have shown with a rigorous approach
and direct comparison that the lower bounds of gesture and
signature passwords have a higher partial guessing metric
than the upper bounds of Android unlock patterns.
We used distinguishability between recognition pass-
words to confirm the validity of discretizing the recogni-
tion passwords by SAX. A reasonable concern that arises
in the discretization of recognition passwords asks whether
the newly discretized passwords can represent original pass-
words. As an authentication method, the primary purpose
of the recognition password feature is to distinguish various
users’ passwords. In other words, we had to keep both false
positive errors and false negative errors low. Therefore, the
distinguishability of passwords can be measured by ROC and
AUROC. To show that SAX does not hurt the distinguishabil-
ity of recognition passwords, we implemented state-of-the-art
recognition methods for passwords and examined their ROC
and AUROC. We found that SAX achieves ROC and AUROC
results comparable to other recognition methods.
Limitations. Two of the gesture datasets (FreeForm [39]
and GuessAttack [29]) and all of the signature datasets [24,
37, 52] in our study were collected in the laboratory, which
in principle could affect the participants’ selection of ges-
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tures and signatures as passwords [51]. By comparing the
gestures collected from the laboratory [39, 14, 29] and in the
wild [51], we do not find any evidence of a clear difference
between the passwords generated under these two types of
environments. Thus, we cannot estimate the influence of
experimental environments on our results.
The three gesture datasets were collected across different
studies, and we aggregated them into one gesture dataset.
Since all of the participants in the three datasets were asked
to create gestures as passwords, different experimental setups
will enlarge the diversity and coverage of the gesture pass-
words. Aggregating datasets from different studies does not
damage our analysis of the password distribution.
Baseline and Dataset Size. There are natural concerns
about dataset size when it comes to estimating the partial
guessing metric. The upper and lower bounds placed on the
partial guessing metric solved this question with fixed param-
eter values of SAX. However, a larger size for the dataset
may also increase the parameter values of SAX. Generally,
a larger dataset size may (1) increase the total size of the
symbolic alphabet used in SAX representation, and (2) assign
probabilities to the newly enumerated passwords.
Alphabet Size. The size of the alphabet provides a base-
line for the security result. The size of the password space
increases as the alphabet size increases since passwords that
are clustered together become separated out more easily. This
reduces the overall size of the weak set; see Figure 3 for an
example. Additionally, Table 3 in Appendix B provides nu-
meric evidence that the partial guessing metric increases as
the alphabet size increases. Collecting additional passwords
would not decrease the overall size of the alphabet. A larger
number of passwords would require a larger alphabet to repre-
sent it if there are new attributes that need to be accounted for
(see Figure 6 for a depiction of how the alphabet maps to a
password). As such, if we collect many more passwords, we
expect the size of the estimated password space to increase
since the alphabet size will increase. This will increase both
the upper and the lower bounds of the security estimation by
the partial guessing metric.
Password Probabilities. The security of passwords is re-
lated to the cracking effectiveness of our Markov chain, which
attacks passwords ordered by probability from high to low.
The password probability calculated by the Markov chain is
mainly affected by the weak sets of gestures and signatures
used to train it. These weak sets, as in text passwords [9],
are concentrated and significantly smaller than the theoretical
password space. If the data sample is representative, then
collecting more user-generated passwords is not expected
to change the partial guessing metric because it would not
significantly affect the ratio of the size of the weak set to the
entire password space. Therefore, additional passwords in the
dataset might stretch the tails of the estimated passwords dis-
tribution – more unlikely passwords would be sampled if the
sample size were increased – but this would not significantly
impact the ratio of the weak set to the whole space because
those points are the most discoverable by definition. Because
we sampled the general distribution repeatedly, we have an
estimate of the true distribution that includes the weak set.
Because the partial guessing metric is functionally dependent
on the coverage of the weak set, the stability of the weak set
size means that the guessing metric will not be impacted by
the tails of the distribution.
Distributional Bias. If the collected data is not representa-
tive and is in fact oversampling either a subset of the weak set
or the tails of the distribution, then this would give a mislead-
ing estimate of the partial guessing metric. This would happen
because the data would misinform the Markov chain about
the probability of the enumerated passwords from the SAX
representation. We have evidence that this is not likely to have
happened. Liu et al. [29] examined the relative frequencies of
different gesture password categories across several gesture
datasets in their cracking paper and found that the relative
frequencies of groups (shapes, words, symbols) are equal
despite being collected at different times by different groups
(see Table 2 in Liu et al. [29]). This is evidence that the col-
lected gestures are being sampled from a general distribution
and not from the tails of such a distribution.
Summary. Our core contribution is true irrespective of the
total set of data one might possibly collect on user-generated
passwords: we have established a baseline for estimating the
upper and lower bounds of the partial guessing metrics of
recognition passwords. While password enumeration and the
Markov chain’s performance can only be improved with fu-
ture data, our current estimates are the best given all publicly
available data at this time. More data can only improve a
model, not negate the utility of the existing model.
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Gesture ω Signature ω
β 4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
4 12.9 19.2 25.7 31.1 36.7 11.8 17.4 23.4 30.9 37.2
5 16.2 24.1 31.6 38.5 45.3 13.5 20.7 29.4 36.9 45.3
6 20.6 29.8 38.5 46.3 56.4 15.9 25.5 34.3 43.3 54.8
7 24.5 33.1 44.4 53.5 63.9 18.3 26.1 39.0 48.9 60.2
8 27.9 39.4 50.3 61.4 71.2 21.6 33.6 45.0 55.5 65.3
(a) α = 0.1
Gesture ω Signature ω
β 4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
4 15.1 21.5 28.2 34.0 40.0 14.2 19.8 26.3 33.8 41.2
5 18.9 27.2 35.6 42.4 49.7 15.9 24.1 32.2 40.9 50.5
6 23.9 33.8 42.4 50.4 60.6 19.5 28.9 37.8 47.5 59.3
7 27.3 37.2 48.3 57.8 68.9 21.9 29.1 43.9 52.8 65.3
8 31.0 42.4 54.0 65.5 75.2 26.7 38.5 49.8 61.0 69.4
(b) α = 0.2
Gesture ω Signature ω
β 4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
4 18.9 25.9 32.9 40.0 46.6 17.9 25.2 33.0 40.0 47.2
5 24.5 32.5 41.1 48.5 56.9 23.3 30.0 39.5 47.4 56.2
6 29.0 38.5 46.3 56.8 67.7 27.2 36.5 44.9 54.9 65.8
7 32.5 42.5 53.9 64.0 74.0 30.3 35.3 51.4 61.1 70.5
8 36.3 47.8 58.9 70.5 78.2 33.6 45.9 57.1 68.0 73.3
(c) α = 0.5
Table 3: Comparing partial entropy with different cracking
rates (α=0.1, 0.2, 0.5) with different parameters values (ω
= 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; β = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) for gestures and signatures.
The decrease of ω and β leads to lower estimated security for
gestures and signatures. However, since the decrease of ω
and β also lead to worse recognition performance as shown
in Figure 7, we need to select the values of ω and β that
optimizes recognition performance.
Figure 13: Coverage of the different 2-gram and 3-gram
variations. There are totally 1296 variations in the 2-gram
model and 46656 variations in the 3-gram model. We found
some of the variations are more likely to be selected by users.
But the bias in selections is not obvious.
Appendix
A Human Bias in N-Gram Markov Chain
The left and right figures in Figure 13 shows the distributions
of the 2-gram model and 3-gram model, respectively. We
found no obvious bias in the two models. For example, the top
200 frequent 3-grams only cover 13.87% of all the variations
in signature passwords.
B Parameter Selection Effect on Security
Table 3 shows the partial guessing entropy of different crack-
ing rates (α=0.1, 0.2, 0.5) for gestures and signatures of Good-
Turing 3-gram Markov chains with different SAX parameter
selections (β=4, 5, 6, 7, 8; ω = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). In order to
show the effect on partial guessing metric estimation with
smaller parameters in our method, we mainly select the values
of α and ω that are less than the optimal value pair, β = 6
and ω = 8, since the larger parameter values always lead to a
higher estimation of partial guessing metric. As a reminder,
β represents the size of alphabet of symbols for 1-D SAX.
Since the gesture and signature are discretized by 2-D SAX,
the size of alphabet should be β2. For example, the size of
the theoretical full passwords space with β = 4 and ω = 4 is
(β2)ω = 65536.
We found the selection of SAX parameters has large effects
on the security estimation of gestures and signatures. With the
decrease of β andω, the estimated security of gestures and sig-
natures also decrease. As a reminder, we selected the optimal
pair of β = 6 and ω = 8 based on AUROC values in Figure 7,
which measures the distinguishability between positive and
negative samples in authentication system. The decrease of β
and ω will also lead to the decrease of distinguishability in
gestures and signatures passwords and significantly harm the
recognition performance of those passwords.
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